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Abstract.
Although IS literature is quite rich on analyzing control modes in interorganizational relationships, there exists quite sparse empirical work on the effects of control modes on the relationship between a platform vendor and thirdparty developers in software-based platform ecosystems. Drawing on IS control
literature and trust theory, we conducted an online survey with 125 game developers of the online gaming platform Steam, in which we examined the perception of clan and self-control mechanisms and how they influence developers’ trust in the platform vendor and their intention to stick with the platform.
We demonstrate that clan control positively impacts both trust and stickiness,
while self-control only affects the latter. Further, our results show that developers’ trust in the platform vendor serves as a mediator explaining the mechanisms of why clan control positively affects platform stickiness.
Keywords: Software Platforms, Informal Control Modes, Trust, Stickiness

1

Introductions

By empowering third-party developers to complement functionalities and applications
to a core software product, software-based platforms have become a promising and
growing approach in the software industry to develop and distribute software [1]. The
ecosystem of such platforms includes the platform vendor, numerous third-party developers and the platform users. Although such platforms exist since the early days of
personal computing, where developers provide software and add-ons for operation
systems and system software, like Microsoft Windows and its office-suite [2, 3], new
and innovative software-platforms have emerged in the mobile and online context [1].
Apple for example, a platform where developers can develop and sell mobile apps,
has experienced a massive overall growth in recent years. This is reflected in six million registered app-developers, more than one million active apps and revenues of 10
billion dollars from their App Store sales in 2013 [4, 5]. The game distribution and
social network platform Steam is on its way to replace the old game retail selling
system, while competing platforms struggle to grow in the same market [6]. These
mobile and online platforms and their ecosystems have already been acknowledged
several times as a significant novel research opportunity for IS research (e.g., [1, 7]).
12th International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik,
March 4-6 2015, Osnabrück, Germany
Goldbach, T.; Benlian, A. (2015): How Informal Control Modes affect Developers' Trust in a Platform
Vendor and Platform Stickiness, in: Thomas. O.; Teuteberg, F. (Hrsg.): Proceedings der 12. Internationalen
Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik (WI 2015), Osnabrück, S. 1328-1342
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Control theory [8] has often been invoked in order to analyze and explain the coordination and alignment between two parties, and control modes are an integral part of
platform governance [1]. While formal control (i.e., process and outcome control)
relies on written contracts and regular observations, informal control (i.e., clan and
self-control) is exercised with social or people strategies by cultivating shared interests and values and by encouraging self-regulation. Informal control is of primary
interest to our study, given that the relationship between a platform vendor and thirdparty developers is less hierarchical and more dependent compared to traditional
software development contexts, which makes the implementation of informal control
more promising than formal control [9-11]. There are two main reasons for this:
First, the relationship of a platform vendor and third-party developers is less hierarchical, because interests and goals, like increasing the platforms’ customer base and
generating revenues, are not necessarily incongruent. Therefore, the intention to engage in opportunistic behaviors is less prominent and the need of strict supervision
and alignment from one side less necessary [11]. Further, software platforms are more
open [12] and the myriad of third-party developers would make it prohibitively costly
and time consuming to command and supervise each single software project.
Second, both parties rely heavily on each other in order to perform
successfully [13]. On the one hand, a platform provides resources and tools for development and distribution of third-party software, and offers access to the platform’s
customer base [14]. Developers hence have to trust the platform vendor that these
crucial resources will continuously be provided. On the other hand, the success of a
platform is prominently determined by having enough developers offering applications on one side to attract customers on the other and vice versa [15]. Consequently,
platform vendors depend on developers’ intention to become loyal members of the
platform ecosystem. Given that trust and loyalty are essential parts of relationship
quality [16] and an enduring and cooperative relationship between a platform vendor
and developers is crucial for a healthy ecosystem [17], we will further focus on developers’ trust in a platform vendor and on stickiness of a platform.
Two major research gaps on control modes and trust are particular noteworthy.
Previous studies have widely examined control modes within organizations (e.g., [18,
19]) and between organizations (e.g., [20, 21]) and have largely focused on formal
control modes (e.g., [20, 22]). However, there is still little understanding about the
effects of informal control modes in online platform contexts. Further, previous work
on the interplay of control modes–either formal or informal–and trust have found
conflicting results about whether the constructs are negatively or positively connected
(e.g., [23, 24]). Studies have, for example, analyzed the interplay of control, trust and
risk in strategic alliances [23], the effects of ideology tenets on team effectiveness
through trust in open source development [25] and the coevolution of trust, control
and learning in joint ventures [26]. Despite significant research in this area, effects of
informal control modes on trust in platform settings has remained underexplored [1].
The purpose of this paper is therefore to understand how informal control modes,
i.e. clan control and self-control, affect third-party developers’ trust in the platform
vendor and stickiness of a platform. In the next section, we lay out the theoretical
background of this paper, followed by our research hypotheses. We describe our re-
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search methodology in section 4 and present the results of an online survey with 125
game developers of the Steam platform in section 5. In section 6, we discuss main
findings, implications and limitations, and conclude the paper with final remarks.

2

Theoretical Background

2.1

Trust in a Platform Vendor

Despite widespread agreement of the importance of trust in human interactions, previous research has defined and conceptualized trust in a variety of ways [27, 28]. In
IS literature, a commonly used definition is the willingness of one party (the trustor)
to be vulnerable to the actions of another party (the trustee), based on the expectation
that the other party will perform a particular important action [29]. While most conceptualizations aim at trust in interpersonal relations, trust in online contexts is often
based on trust in organizations [30]. For instance, customers may trust an online
shopping website for purchasing products, or third-party developers place their trust
in a platform vendor or in a software platform as a collective actor.
Three dimensions are constantly used in e-commerce literature for characterizing
trust, i.e. the beliefs in the competence, integrity and benevolence of the trustee [28,
29]. In a platform context, competence refers to the developer’s perception of the
ability and knowledge of a platform vendor to perform needed actions and to show
expected behaviors. Developers for example expect from a platform vendor to have
knowledge about providing a technical infrastructure, to have the ability to attract
customers and to promote the platform with its products. Integrity is the perception
that a platform vendor will act ethically and adhere to announced or expected principles and promises. Developers for example believe that a platform vendor provides
promised resources and development tools and places products in the platform’s store
equitably. Finally, benevolence refers to the beliefs that a platform vendor will generally do good and will not behave merely opportunistic. A platform vendor may, for
example, demonstrate benevolence by showing empathy towards developers’ concerns and needs, which in turn may reduce uncertainty on the developers’ side.
2.2

Platform Stickiness

As a crucial platform-related outcome, third-party developers’ loyalty towards a platform, i.e. their willingness to constantly participate in and stick with a platform over
time, has been shown to maintain a healthy platform ecosystem [17]. Accordingly,
platform stickiness is a crucial performance factor that indicates a persistent and loyal
relationship between a platform and its developers. Based on Zott et al. [31], we define platform stickiness as the ability of a platform to retain third-party developers on
their platform, which is reflected in developers’ intention to continue contributing to a
platform ecosystem. When developers continue to develop and update apps for the
platform and to engage in the platform community, they usually contribute to the
platform’s productivity, robustness and innovative capacity [15, 17]. By contrast,

1330

when developers switch to a rival platform, they are likely to destabilize the abandoned platform ecosystem through the drain of knowledge and expertise. Even worse,
rival platforms and their customer bases may benefit from the influx of developers
and their apps, which may ultimately tip network effects in favor of rival platforms.
2.3

Platform Control Modes

According to control literature (e.g., [8, 32]), control refers to a controller’s attempts
by which he or she influences an individual or an individual group (the controlee) to
act in accordance with the objectives of the controller. Control modes can be subdivided into formal control and informal control. Formal control, can be further split
into output and process (or also called behavior) control. With output control, controllers pre-specify output requirements and performance targets as objectives, which are
then monitored, evaluated and accordingly rewarded. By contrast, under process control, specific procedures and methodologies are pre-determined, while characteristics
of outcomes are free to be chosen by the controlee.
Informal control is categorized into clan control and self-control [8, 32]. Through
clan control, controllers are able to minimize the differences between controlee’s
goals and their own strategies, by promulgating common values, beliefs, and behaviors. Members of a group of controlees therefore usually commit themselves to these
mutual values and beliefs and thus often adopt comparable processes with similar
performance outcomes. Clan control may lead to a sense of cohesiveness among clan
members, which in turn facilitates self-regulatory mechanisms on a group level (e.g.,
monitoring, evaluating and correcting each other) in accordance with shared values
and beliefs. In terms of self-control, controllers encourage controlees to exercise selfmanagement and self-regulation by granting autonomy, providing tools for selfmanagement and structuring the work environment appropriately. Controlees can
organize themselves, mostly make their own decisions and evaluate themselves based
on their own performance. Thus, control lies in the hands of each controlee.
Currently, a variety of informal control mechanisms are observed on softwarebased platforms [1]. As an example for clan control, Apple positions its products,
primarily through its promotional campaigns and branding strategies, as being innovative, well designed and for people with a trendy lifestyle, which is reflected in the
design, usability and user experience of Apple products. Customers and third-party
developers mainly share these norms and values, which in turn manifest themselves in
the high-quality designs of third-party apps. Conversely, design regulations are mostly absent in Google’s Android ecosystem and therefore developers individually decide on the look-and-feel of their apps, which is an example for self-control [11].

3

Hypotheses Development

We first develop the hypotheses related to the effects of clan and self-control on trust
in the platform vendor (H1) and platform stickiness (H2), followed by hypotheses
related to the mediating role of trust (H3). The research model is shown in Figure 1.
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3.1

The Effects of Informal Control Modes on Trust in Platform Vendor

By definition, clans rely heavily on trust [33]. With clan control mechanisms, controllers are able to minimize the differences between controlee’s goals and their own
strategies, by promulgating common values, beliefs, and behaviors. Carefully selecting and socializing members usually serves in identifying with shared beliefs and in
adopting comparable goals and behaviors, which in turn often results in a group of
individuals sharing these commonalities [8]. Strong clan cultures are likely to facilitate cohesiveness which in turn strengthens the willingness of controlees to trust the
other party’s benevolence [33]. Further, being certain that a partner will pursue shared
goals instead of opportunistic interest usually leads to a higher confidence in the partner and the partners integrity [23]. Applied to the platform context, nurturing common
platform values and cultivating shared goals might in turn also cultivate developers’
trust in the platform vendor.
Self-control is based on self-management and self-regulating mechanisms. In order
to implement self-control, controllers are granting autonomy to controlees without
applying any other forms of regulation [8]. In view of the absence of regulation,
granting autonomy requires a certain degree of trust in the controlees’ intention to
behave accordingly to the controller’s interests and goals [21]. Given that trust is seen
as a reciprocal concept, more trust by one party usually results in more trust by the
other party [23]. Therefore, controllers being trusted to regulate themselves will increase their intention to trust the controlee. Against this backdrop, granting autonomy
to developers in a platform setting may also lead to more trust in the platform vendor.
These arguments suggest that third-party developers will place more trust in a platform vendor, if higher levels of both clan and self-control are perceived. Accordingly,
we hypothesize that: H1a: Clan Control is positively related to Trust in Platform
Vendor. H1b: Self Control is positively related to Trust in Platform Vendor.
3.2

The Effects of Informal Control Modes on Platform Stickiness

Clan control is exercised to minimize differences between two parties in terms of their
interests and goals by declaring common values, beliefs and behaviors [8]. On the one
hand, clan control is therefore facilitating a sense of belonging and togetherness.
Working for and with people with similar interests and mindsets and with common
goals may lead to a homelike feeling along with loyalty and commitment to the group
or company [23, 33]. On the other hand, shared visions and values are reducing the
possibility of incongruent preferences and goals. Therefore, if a controlee agrees with
the controllers’ goals and beliefs and acts in similar ways, the risk of producing variances in outcomes of importance to the controlee is minimized [23, 33]. This lower
risk and higher sense of belonging is in turn likely to translate into a higher intention
to stay with the group. Applied to the platform context, if developers share similar
values and goals with a platform, they may perceive lower risks and higher cohesiveness which in turn may result in a higher intention to keep contributing to the platform
As mentioned above, self-control is based on self-regulation through granting autonomy to controlees. According to self-determination theory [34], human beings’

1332

perceptions of autonomy are related to higher intrinsic motivation, more creativity,
higher self-esteem, less tension and a higher work satisfaction. Previous empirical
research has shown that employees feel more satisfied with their working place in an
organization, when they are not under permanent scrutiny, but feel more independent
in pursuing their personal goals [35]. This higher autonomy under self-control in platform settings is also likely to translate into higher loyalty with and stickiness to the
platform, given that developers feel more self-determined, satisfied and more committed to a platform. In contrast, reducing developers’ autonomy may lead to lower intrinsic motivation, less satisfaction and thus in a lower intention to stick with the platform. Consequently, we suggest that third-party developers will have a higher intention to stick with a platform under a higher perception of clan control and self-control.
H2a: Clan Control is positively related to Platform Stickiness. H2b: Self-Control is
positively related to Platform Stickiness.
3.3

The Mediating Effect of Trust in Platform Vendor

Given the high importance and prevalence of trust for enduring relationships in platform ecosystems, we suggest that developers’ trust in a platform vendor is one essential mediation mechanism explaining the effects of clan and self-control on developers’ intention to stick with a platform. As studies have shown, trusting beliefs are
transformed into perceptions that a trustee has attributes that can be relied on and that
are beneficial for the trustor [27]. Trust frees the trustor from worrying about potential
risks of doing business with the trustee and about the anxiety of being exploited. The
resulting sense of secureness is likely translated into a comfortable feeling with and
loyalty towards the other party along with an enjoyment in conducting business together [36]. A reduced perception of risks, caused by a higher level of trust to a business partner, strengthens the loyalty towards this partner [23]. If a business partner is
trusted, additional exhaustive monitoring of changes in rules or procedures becomes
unnecessary and therefore saves costs, time and energy [36] which also enhance the
intention to keep cooperating with a partner. Moreover, according to e-commerce
literature [37], trust in an online-seller and the resulting satisfaction with the seller
usually leads to repurchase intentions. Applied to the platform context, if developers
place trust towards a platform and believe in the platform’s reliability, they may also
perceive less risk, feel more secure and therefore enjoy working for and with the platform, which in turn may lead to a higher intention to contribute to the platform.
These arguments and previous empirical evidence suggest that a higher level of
trust in the platform vendor will lead to a higher intention to stick with the platform.
Further, given that fostering shared norms and values as well as encouraging selfmanagement may stimulate trust, we suggest that trust is a major explanatory factory
of why clan control as well as self-control leads to higher platform stickiness. In other
words, clan control and self-control will lead to a higher stickiness with the platform
because of higher trust in the platform vendor. H3a: Effects of Clan Control on Platform Stickiness are mediated by Trust in Platform Vendor. H3b: Effects of SelfControl on Platform Stickiness are mediated by Trust in Platform Vendor.
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H2a

Clan Control
(CC)
H1a

Trust in
Platform Vendor
(TPV)

Platform
Stickiness (PS)

H1b
H2b

Self-Control
(SC)

H3a = CCTPVPS

H3b = SCTPVPS

Fig. 1. Research Model and Hypotheses

4

Research Methodology

4.1

Data Collection and Sample Description

In order to verify our hypotheses, we created an online survey instrument to collect
empirical data with developers of the above mentioned online gaming platform
Steam. Steam1 is a typical two-sided software platform operated by Valve Corporation. The platform has more than 75 million registered users worldwide [6] and more
than 1.000 developers (including professional and freelance game developers) who
develop, publish and distribute over 3.300 games and even more game modifications
(called mods) via Steam. Users are provided with installation and automatic updating
of games on multiple computers, and community features such as friends lists, cloud
saving, and chat functionality. Steam has introduced an initiative to support developers (called Steam Greenlight) and tools to simplify the developing and distribution
process (called Steam Works). With the freely available application programming
interface (API), developers can integrate many of Steam's functions, including networking and matchmaking, in-game achievements, micro-transactions, and support
for user-created content. In order to develop, publish and distribute games via Steam,
game developers have to follow specific procedures and adhere to specific rules and
conditions that serve as typical control mechanisms by the platform.
To obtain the contact details of Steam developers, we collected the names of all
third-party developers published on the Steam platform. After deleting duplicate
names and no longer existing developers, we gathered e-mail addresses or identified
contact forms and Facebook pages by visiting developers’ websites. Via these channels, a link to the online survey questionnaire was sent to 870 developer studios,
1

We ran a web crawler on http://store.steampowered.com in July 2014 to get the latest developer and game statistics.
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along with a letter outlining the purpose of our research, ensuring confidentiality and
anonymity of the responses, and asking to forward the survey to the lead developer
who could serve as key informant to provide answers to our survey questions [38]. As
a reward for participation, participants were entered into a lottery for a tablet, an
e-book reader or Amazon gift cards. Furthermore, participants received a management report with the core results of the study.
After two follow-up reminders via e-mail, and after deleting responses because of
missing and inconsistent values, we received 125 valid responses, resulting in a response rate of 14.4%. All participating developers were lead developers and represented a distinct development company. Nonresponse bias was assessed by verifying
that early and late respondents were not significantly different [39]. Both samples
were compared based on their sociodemographics and responses to principal constructs in the study, and t‑tests between the means of the early (first 50) and late (last
50) respondents showed no significant differences (p > 0.05). Overall, these findings
indicate that nonresponse bias is unlikely to be a major issue in this study.
The majority of developers in our sample were freelance developers (73.4%) and
were located in the US (34.5%), Canada (10.3%) and the UK (5.2%). Most developer
companies had been founded after 2007 (69.9%) and employed between 10 and 49
people (70.4%). Most games published by the developing companies in our sample
were indie games (70.4%), action (54.8%) and adventure (40%). The prices vary
mostly between $5US and $20US. Almost 70% of the developers in our sample had
more than 5 years of game development experience, while 67% had more than 1 year
of experience with developing for Steam. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Sample Descriptives (N = 125)
Number of employees in company:
< 10
0.0 %
10 – 49
70.4 %
50 – 250
24.3 %
> 250
5.3 %
Price range of Steam games:
< $5
10.4
$5 – $10
40.0
$11 – $20
38.3
> $21
11.3
Game genres (multi-selection):
Action
54.8 %
Adventure
40.0 %
Strategy
38.3 %
Roleplaying
25.2 %
Indie
70.4 %
Casual
34.8 %
Simulation
23.5 %

Employment of developers:
Professional game developer
17.4 %
Freelance developer
73.4 %
Hobbyist developer
7.0 %
Other
2.6 %
Years of experience in game development:
less than 1 year
1.7 %
1 to 3 years
11.3 %
3 to 5 years
17.4 %
5 to 7 years
17.4 %
7 to 9 years
14.8 %
More than 9 years
37.4 %
Years of experience of developing for Steam:
less than 1year
33.0 %
1 to 3 years
36.5 %
3 to 5 years
19.1 %
5 to 7 years
8.7 %
7 to 9 years
1.7 %
More than 9 years
0.9 %
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4.2

Measurement of Variables and Measurement Model Assessment

All constructs in the survey instrument were based on established measures from
existing scales in IS literature and adapted to the study’s context with minor wording
changes. Measures for clan control and self-control were adopted from Tiwana and
Keil [21], based on control measures of Kirsch et al. [19]. We focused the clan control
measurement on the understanding of the Steam platform’s goals, values, norms and
rules in order to capture developers’ perception of clan control execution. During our
qualitative pre-test phase, and because of the specific characteristics of the Steam
platform compared to organizational clan control, we found this measurement more
suitable for the Steam context. Measures for platform stickiness were adopted from
the website stickiness construct of Dahui et al. [40] and adjusted to the general platform context. Given that the measurement model of trust has often been misspecified
in IS research [41, 42], we modeled trust as a second-order formative construct, following the guidelines provided by Jarvis et al. [43]. We based our trust conceptualization on the trusting belief construct of McKnight et al. [28]. We included one item for
each subdimension of trust (i.e. competence, integrity and benevolence), which was
found to be appropriate [41]. All the questionnaire items were measured using a 7point-Likert scale, anchored at (1) = strongly disagree and (7) = strongly agree. All of
the items of the constructs and their sources are shown in Table 2 in the Appendix.
For analyzing measurement properties of a model with second-order factors in
PLS, we followed the recommendations of Wang and Benbasat [44], by first analyzing the measurement properties of all reflective constructs. Next, we replaced our
first-order constructs with their latent variable scores provided by SmartPLS, which
then allows us to analyze the structural paths of the model.
The psychometric properties of the reflective measurement models were assessed
by examining content validity, convergent validity, and discriminant validity of all
latent constructs. In order to ensure content validity, we developed questions for indicators from previous research and performed a qualitative pre-test to check for ambiguities. Convergent validity was evaluated using three criteria recommended by
Fornell and Larcker [45]: (1) all measurement factor loadings must be significant and
above the threshold value of .70; (2) the composite reliabilities should exceed .80; and
(3) the average variance extracted (AVE) by each construct must exceed the variance
due to measurement error for that construct (i.e., AVE should exceed .50).
All loadings of the reflective measurement items on their respective factors were
significant (p < .001) and above .827. Composite reliabilities of the constructs were
all above .937 and the values for AVEs for each construct ranged from .833 to .893.
Therefore, all of our constructs fulfill these three criteria and met the norms for convergent validity. In addition, for satisfactory discriminant validity, the square root of
the AVE from the construct should be greater than the variance shared between a
construct and other constructs in the model [45]. Inter-correlation values between the
latent variables are ranging between .303 and .601 and are therefore lower than the
square root of the AVEs, providing strong evidence of discriminant validity. Hence,
the constructs in our study represent concepts that are both theoretically and empirically distinguishable. In order to establish construct validity for our formative indica-
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tors, we relied on the approach of Ringle et al. [46] by ensuring that the indicator
weights for formative constructs are roughly equal and all have significant t-values,
which we were able to determine in SmartPLS for our formative items.

5

Data Analysis and Results

We used structural equation modeling using partial least squares (PLS) to test our
research model in general, and our mediation hypotheses in particular. PLS allows for
simultaneous testing of the measurement model (the psychometric properties of the
measurement scales) and the estimation of the structural model (the strength and direction of the relationship between the variables). PLS has an added advantage over
covariance-based methods (e.g., LISREL) in that (1) it maximizes the explained variance of endogenous variables in the structural model [47], which enables us to understand the amount of variance explained in the constructs, such as trust in platform
vendor or platform stickiness, and (2) PLS does not make distributional assumptions
for the data [47]. We used the software SmartPLS 2.0 M3 [48] and a two-step procedure to examine our hypotheses. In step 1, we analyzed the direct effects of clan control and self-control on trust in a platform vendor and platform stickiness. In step 2,
we introduced trust in platform vendor as a mediating mechanism into the structural
model (by adding the path from trust to stickiness), following the recommendations
by Preacher and Hayes [49]. The final results of step 2 are shown in Figure 2.
The structural model in step 1 successfully explained a considerable portion of variance in trust in platform vendor (R2 = .279) and platform stickiness (R2 = .393). Concerning the path coefficients, we found positive and significant effects of clan control
on trust in platform vendor (β = .520; p < .001) and on platform stickiness (β = .510; p
< .001), which is in support of H1a and H2a. Further, self-control similarly had a
positive and significant effect on platform stickiness (β = .201; p < .05), while there
was no significant effect on trust in platform vendor (β = .003; p > .05). Therefore,
H1b could be supported while H2b had to be rejected.
In step 2 of the PLS-SEM analysis, we assessed the results of the full path model
including the impact of the mediator trust on platform stickiness. The variance explained in platform stickiness increased substantially (R2 = .450) compared to the
analysis in step 1, due to the significant positive impact of trust in platform vendor on
platform stickiness (β = .282; p < .05). Clan control had a significant indirect effect on
platform stickiness via trust in platform vendor (β = .144, p < .01), while the direct
effect decreased but remained significant (β = .358, p < .01). Therefore, trust in platform vendor partially (by 29.8 %) mediated the relationship between clan control and
platform stickiness. Although self-control had a significant direct effect on platform
stickiness (β = .192; p < .05), we could not find a significant mediation effect on platform stickiness through trust, given that self-control had no significant impact on trust
in platform vendor (β = .003; p > .05). Therefore, we had to reject H2a.
We also analyzed a full model including several control variables (i.e., developer
employment, development experience, number of employees in company), but did not
find any significant impact on trust or platform stickiness (p > 0.5).
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.358**

Clan Control
.520***

Trust in
Platform Vendor
R2=.276

.282*

Platform
Stickiness
R2=.450

.003n.s.
.192*

Self-Control

Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05;

non-sig.,

sig.

Fig. 2. Results of SEM Analysis

6

Discussion and Conclusion

Two key findings can be derived from this study. First, our findings show that clan
control positively impacts both trust in platform vendor and platform stickiness, while
self-control only affects the latter. Working autonomously may therefore not sufficiently flourish developer’s trust towards a platform vendor. Second, our results show
that developers’ trust in a platform vendor serves as a mediator between clan control
and platform stickiness. Given that trust and loyalty are essential parts of relationship
quality [16] and that an enduring cooperative relationship between a platform vendor
and third-party developers is crucial for a healthy successful platform [13, 17], our
findings demonstrate the high importance of informal control in platform setting.
6.1

Theoretical and practical implications

From a theoretical standpoint, our study offers a deeper understanding of the effects
of informal control modes on third-party developers’ trust in a platform vendor and
platform stickiness in software-platform settings. We show in our study that clan and
self-control positively affects developers’ intention to stick with a platform, and that
clan control leads to higher developer’s trust in the platform vendor. The latter is in
line with related findings in an open source setting [25]. Further, trust positively affects developers’ intention to stick with the platform and therefore serves as an explanation of why clan control positively affects platform stickiness. Our study establishes
the importance of informal control as a driver for third-party developers’ trust and
loyalty in platform settings. It thus contributes to IS control literature by studying
informal control in a yet underexplored context and advances platform governance
literature by highlighting the importance of informal control as central governance
devices to shape trust-building and loyalty on platforms.
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Our results have also important implications for practice. First, platform vendors
may increasingly focus on cultivating trust in their relationship with third-party developers by keeping in mind that satisfying developers’ needs and expectations about
the platform might strengthens their trust towards the platform. Platform vendors
might, for example, continuously provide and expand prior agreed upon resources for
development and distribution, along with solving technical difficulties and promoting
the platform products. Second, implementing clan control mechanisms specifically
affects developer’s trust towards the platform. Platform vendors may promulgate and
reinforce common values, beliefs and behaviors by publishing regular company newsletters and best practice solutions, and by arranging socialization processes and ceremonies, like developer-centric events and conferences (e.g., Apple’s yearly Developers Conference in San Francisco). Further, encouraging self-management by granting
more autonomy and structuring the work environment appropriately, platform vendors may additionally encourage developers to exert self-control which additionally
contributes to developer’s stickiness with the platform.
6.2

Limitations and Further Research

As a concluding reflection, we point out the main limitations of our study. First, the
results of our study are based on a platform in an online gaming context. Such platforms may differ from mobile or social networking platforms, regarding implemented
informal control modes and the interactions between platform vendors and developers. Additionally, because the sample consisted mainly of freelance developers with
indie games, our results may not be representative for professional game development
studios. Hence, issues of generalizability may exist. Future studies should focus on
additional software-based platforms, like Apple’s App Store or Google’s Android
ecosystem, with a more representative mix of hobbyist and professional developers to
strengthen external validity. Second, we based our measurement of clan control mainly on the scope of understanding shared values, goals and rules. Future research could
examine a broader view of clan control and community behaviors as well as explicitly
examining the antecedents and impacts of sub-dimensions of trust [28] in order to
provide a richer understanding of the role of trust and clan control in platform contexts. Third, future work may extend our research model by including other factors.
We focused our study on informal control modes, while the effects of formal control
modes (process and output) [8] may also lead to promising results. Likewise, other
factors affecting cooperative relationships (e.g., empathy, security or autonomy) and
other developer and platform-related outcomes (e.g., application quality, development
costs or user count) may also enhance our research model.
6.3

Conclusion

How can platform vendors create an enduring and cooperative relationship with thirdparty developers in order to work towards a successful platform ecosystem? By integrating control literature and trust theory, results of our survey study suggest implementing clan and self-control on platforms cultivates developers’ trust in a platform
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vendor and stickiness with the platform. We believe that examining control modes as
well as trust in platform settings is a rich avenue for future research, especially given
that hitherto under-researched informal control modes are gaining in importance.
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Appendix
Table 2. Measurement Items
Constructs
Indicators
Clan Control Do you clearly understand …
(CC)
... the goals of the Steam platform.

Source
Based on
[19, 21]

... the values of the Steam platform.
... the norms and rules of the Steam platform.
Self-Control
(SC)

Do you autonomously ...

[19, 21]

... set specific goals without the platform owner’s involvement.
... set release schedules for your games without the platform owner’s involvement.
... define development and publishing procedures without the
platform owner’s involvement.

Trust in
Platform
Vendor
(TBV)

Regarding the platform vendor …

Platform
Stickiness
(PS)

I am planning to keep using the Steam platform for game
development and distribution in the future.

[28]

… I believe that Steam is capable in solving technical problems.
… I believe Steam would keep its agreements.
… Steam would do its best to market and sell my games.

I would not hesitate to use the Steam platform for game
development and distribution in the future.
I am very likely to use the Steam platform for game development
and distribution in the future.
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[40]

